

**ATTACHMENT F, ANNEX 25
TERRORISM INCIDENT**

Future revisions of this plan will be published separately but will become Appendix 4 to the South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan. The following plan remains in effect until the next revision of the Terrorism Incident Plan scheduled to be published in 2006.

Primary: SC Law Enforcement Division

Support: South Carolina Emergency Management Division, Office of the Adjutant General, SC National Guard; American Red Cross; Department of Health and Environmental Control; Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, Division of Fire and Life Safety; Department of Mental Health; Department of Natural Resources; Department of Public Safety; Department of Social Services; Department of Transportation

I. PURPOSE

This plan provides a defined process for a coordinated and efficient response to terrorism incidents within the state of South Carolina. The purpose of this plan is to:

- A. Establish assumptions and policies.
- B. Develop a concept of operations that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of all agencies--federal, state, and local--involved in Crisis and Consequence Management.
- C. Incorporate the coordination mechanisms and structures of appropriate state, county, city, facility, and business/industry plans into the overall response.
- D. Assign specific functional responsibilities to appropriate departments and agencies and identify the actions that these departments and agencies will take in the overall response in coordination with federal, state, and local agencies.

II. SCOPE

- A. The FBI defines terrorism as *“the unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or individual against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”*
- B. This plan applies to all state departments and agencies within South Carolina tasked to provide primary or support roles during a terrorist

incident. This plan is intended to provide guidance and clarification to all departments and agencies involved in terrorist response activities.

- C. This plan addresses the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local departments and agencies and should be used in conjunction with the National Response Plan, the State of South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan, and County Emergency Operations Plans.

III. SITUATION

- A. Terrorist incidents, including threats of potential incidents, create a unique challenge to public safety officials at every level of government. There are distinct legal authorities that impact how either the threat or incidents of terrorism are managed. There are special organizational structures that come into play only in terrorist incidents, specialized resources that may be required, supported and managed, as well as special risks to the general public, first responders, and local public health officials.
- B. Terrorist incidents are not normal hazardous materials incidents or normal emergency response incidents. Terrorists focus on the placement, timing, dispersion mechanism, and impact on the targeted population to achieve maximum political or social results. There are numerous other weapons (nuclear, infectious biological, lasers, thermo-baric, EMP, cyber, explosives, incendiary, etc) that the terrorist can use to achieve his objectives besides the weaponization of hazardous materials.
- C. Published operational plans can be used to design the initial or secondary attacks and the security of sensitive elements within the plans (rapid evacuation routes, predetermined secure ingress and egress routes of emergency services and supplies, predetermined staging and standby points, location of caches of specialized equipment and pharmaceuticals, lists of specially trained personnel, early warning communication structures, potential targets, etc) should be evaluated by law enforcement personnel for operational security.
- D. Despite the significant federal role in terrorism response, state and local governments have the primary responsibility for protecting public health and safety. Local law enforcement, emergency medical services (EMS), and fire service agencies will be the first units to respond to a terrorist incident. Local health care facilities will be required to provide treatment to victims, and in cases of chemical or biological attacks, rapidly identify the substance used in the attack. Citizens will inevitably look to local and state officials and familiar media personalities for information regarding what has occurred and what actions are being taken.

- E. These realities make readiness at the local and state level the cornerstone of America's domestic preparedness strategy. While the federal government can provide many specialized resources, the fundamental effectiveness of any response to a terrorist incident, or the threat of an incident, will depend on what occurs in local communities and at the state level.

IV. ASSUMPTIONS

- A. The citizens and property in South Carolina could be at risk from primary terrorist threats and activities or secondary effects from attacks occurring in other states or nations.
- B. Responsible training and implementation of established counter-terrorist procedures can reduce the effects of terrorism.
- C. A terrorist incident may occur with little or no advanced warning at any time of day.
- D. Local and state agencies should have the capability to manage the initial crisis and consequence responses to a threat or an actual terrorist incident.
- E. The nature and scope of many terrorist events will require significant state and federal government support and assistance before and after an incident.
- F. An effective response to a terrorist threat or incident will require careful coordination in planning, training and operations among local, state and federal agencies representing many different functions and disciplines.
- G. The initial effects of a terrorist attack may appear to be normal emergencies involving agents that affect mass populations.

V. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES

- A. SC Code of Laws, Section 23-3-15 (A) (8)
- B. South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan
- C. National Response Plan, as amended
- D. Homeland Security Presidential Directives
- E. Local Emergency Operations Plans

VI. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. Mission

To establish the policies and procedures that will prevent or minimize terrorist activities, assist in the apprehension of the persons responsible for the incident, and maximize the effectiveness of the state response to, and recovery from a terrorist incident.

B. Authority for Coordinating Terrorism Threat Operations

In accordance with SC Code of Laws Section 23-3-15 (A) (8), SLED has specific and exclusive jurisdiction and authority in preparing for and coordinating the state response in the event of a terrorist threat or actual incident.

C. Crisis and Consequence Management

1. Crisis Management

- a. Overall Crisis Management is the law enforcement response to the causes of terrorist incidents, terrorists, and their weapons. It includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan for the use of resources needed to anticipate, isolate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. With a weapon of mass destruction, nuclear, biological, or chemical incident, a Crisis Management response may include traditional law enforcement missions (*i.e.*, intelligence, surveillance, tactical, negotiations, forensics, investigations relating to apprehending the terrorists, etc.) and technical support missions (*i.e.*, agent identification, search, disablement, transfer, and disposal, and limited decontamination relating to the terrorist's weapons).
- b. Under the laws of the United States, confirmed by federal policy, (HSPD-5), the U.S. Attorney General, primarily acting through the FBI, has been assigned the lead responsibility for investigations and intelligence collection activities. The FBI leads this effort with assistance from other federal, state, and local agencies as necessary. The lead State agency is the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division. The lead county agency is the local law enforcement agency designated in the county EOP. The federal law enforcement effort will be managed from the Joint Operations Center (JOC) when established, under the direction of the FBI's Special Agent in Charge (FBI SAC).

- c. Law Enforcement public safety functions are managed through the Operations section of the ICS on a local level and law enforcement ESFs at the EOC level.

2. Consequence Management

- a. Consequence Management addresses the effects of terrorist threats or incidents on people, property and communities. It includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.
- b. A DHS designated representative will be assigned the lead responsibility for coordinating the federal consequence management response to a terrorist incident. The State of South Carolina and local agencies exercise the preeminent authority to make decisions regarding the consequences of terrorism. All actions will be coordinated with the FBI SAC and with the JOC Consequence Management Group, if established, via state and local liaisons. The federal government provides assistance as required and as requested by the State of South Carolina and local government agencies.

3. Interrelationship of Crisis and Consequence Management

Crisis and Consequence Management may occur simultaneously during a threat or actual incident. For instance, while crisis management agencies are evaluating a threat for credibility, consequence management agencies may begin evaluating what actions can be taken to prepare for the consequences resulting from a credible threat or the occurrence of an actual terrorist incident. Prior to an incident crisis management is the focus of activities, however, with an impending or actual incident consequence management activities receive priority.

D. Response Operations

Recommendations are for actions that need to be accomplished regardless of the weapon involved.

1. Pre-incident

- a. Pre-Incident Threats: Federal, state, or local entities may notify state agencies, including emergency management, of

a threat. Information regarding terrorist threats or potential activities received by state agencies must be reported to the local law enforcement. Responsibility for initiating and conducting Crisis Management activities rests with the local law enforcement pending the arrival of the SLED and the FBI. Prompt response employing such actions as citizen evacuation and isolation of the incident is the initial responsibility of local law enforcement. If assuming control, the FBI will manage the Crisis Management response from the command post and/or the JOC. State and local resources may be called upon to support this operation. State emergency management may implement procedures to alert local, state, and/or federal agencies involved in Consequence Management and, if requested by the FBI SAC, will deploy state representatives to the JOC. Pre-Incident operations will vary based on the FBI and SLED analysis of the threat. The FBI manages a Terrorist Threat Warning System that provides vital information to counterterrorism and law enforcement authorities. The levels of warning are:

FBI Threat Level #1 Assessment: Received information does not warrant actions beyond normal liaison notifications (agencies are operating under normal day to day conditions). This level is to impart facts and/or threat analysis concerning terrorism.

FBI Threat Level #2 Advisory: Intelligence or articulated threat indicates a credible threat but is general in both timing and target.

FBI Threat Level #3 Alert: A threat assessment indicates that the threat is credible and specific.

- b. Pre-Incident Response: The objective of pre-incident Consequence Management is to provide time for response agencies to prepare for the potential effects of an incident. This can include the following based on the threat analysis:
 - 1) Dissemination of information and warnings (e.g. identifying areas that may be affected by the projected incident and providing safety information for people within those areas);

- 2) Acceleration of normal preparedness and mitigation measures (e.g., developing monitoring plans to survey safe areas where citizens may be sent);
 - 3) Increasing readiness to respond (e.g. requesting and pre-positioning equipment and supplies necessary for sheltering, treating exposed populations, and monitoring);
 - 4) Implementing emergency protective actions (e.g. advising people to shelter-in-place or identifying shelter locations or safe areas for people to move to); and
 - 5) Initiating emergency response activities (e.g. conducting precautionary evacuations, making notifications, and requesting activation, including stand-by notifications of federal, state, and response teams and resources).
2. Situation Progression: As the situation evolves, the potential for significant consequences may become imminent. At such time, the state will re-deploy its Consequence Management response agencies from the JOC to SEOC but maintain a liaison presence in the JOC or JFO to coordinate actions with the Federal law enforcement activities. The Director of SCEMD will immediately consult with the Director of RRCC to determine whether to pre-deploy federal Consequence Management assets. The Director, SCEMD, will initiate action to implement the SCEOP.
3. Terrorist Incident Consequence Management:- A terrorism incident has occurred which requires an immediate process to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources to augment local authorities in response to the consequences of a terrorist incident. If an incident occurs without warning that appears to be caused by an act of terrorism, SLED and SCEMD will initiate Crisis and Consequence management actions concurrently. SCEMD will immediately consult with the RRCC to determine the scope of the National Consequence Management response. The Director of, SCEMD, and the Chief of SLED will immediately consult with the Governor's Office to provide an initial assessment and make a recommendation regarding the request for federal assistance. The State Emergency Response Team (SERT) Executive Coordination Group, consisting of SCEMD, SLED, and other key agencies will make recommendations to the Governor concerning incident management decisions. SCEMD will maintain a liaison officer in

the JOC or JFO to insure continuity and coordination of operations.

- a. Post-Incident Threats: If a terrorist threat notification is received by a state agency, local law enforcement will be notified. All information on terrorist threats and activities will be reported to SLED who will notify the FBI and SCEMD in accordance with the threat assessment and notification procedures. The JTTF will coordinate the receipt and assessment of threat information.
- b. Coordination of the Local Response: Incident scenes should be managed by integrating the federal, state, and local response into the local Incident Command System through a Unified Command Organization. Initial state and federal governments provide assistance as requested by the Incident Commander through the county emergency management until such time as the county EOC is operational and directing requests. At this time the coordination of assistance should be through the county EOC.
- c. Coordination of the State Response: The response to the consequences of a terrorist incident will be coordinated by the SERT from the Emergency Operations Center and will be conducted in consultation with local emergency management and law enforcement, the JOC, and the FBI.
- d. Analysis of the Nature and Magnitude of the Consequences: The nature and magnitude of the incident will determine the degree and amount of local, state, and federal assistance required. Therefore, an incident response analysis should be conducted prior to the dedication of the majority of the state assets. This should be based on current/anticipated threats and the current state of vulnerability. If necessary, assets should be held in reserve to respond to secondary targets elsewhere in the state. The final recommendations rest with the SERT Executive Coordination Group, in consultation with federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities.
- e. Secondary Targets and Crime Scene Preservation:
 - 1) As state departments and agencies may be primary or secondary targets, the heads of the various departments and agencies are responsible for the

security of their respective personnel, equipment and facilities. Due to the fact that terrorist acts may involve a variety of tactics and weapons, state agencies must be aware that secondary targets may be their first responders and appropriate law enforcement protection and coordination must be available. State responders must also be aware that the crime scene may harbor additional hazards to responders as they carry out their responsibilities.

- 2) State agencies must preserve the crime scene while performing activities. While responding to the incident and carrying out their functional responsibilities, state first responders become potential witnesses, investigators, and sources of intelligence in support of the crime scene investigation. As such, they must be trained in observing the incident area as a potential crime scene that may provide evidence in determining the cause of the event and identifying those responsible.
- f. Staging and Deployment of Rapid Response Assets (teams or equipment): The state and federal governments' assistance for responding to terrorist incidents may include special resources not available at the local or state level. A number of specialized teams (local, state, interstate, and federal) are currently available or under formation throughout the state and nation. Therefore designated and secure staging points will be determined prior to arrival of rapid response teams or other specialized assistance. These points must be free of secondary devices, and potential release areas adjacent to these points must be secured. Pre-deployment requirements must be determined for each specialized team or asset. These assets and teams are very specialized in capability but are usually few in number. Therefore deployment plans must anticipate redeployment en-route and rapid extraction procedures in case secondary incidents occur or the initial effects were underestimated. Two scenarios should be anticipated:
- 1) Isolated Incident Scene: In the initial response to an isolated incident scene (one city or county), the staging of specialized assets should be designated by the county emergency management requesting the assets, providing that the necessary security and pre-deployment plans are in place. Secondary

specialized response assets should be staged for backup and secondary target operations near major transportation hubs, where the threat and vulnerability indicates, to avoid concentrating valuable assets and offering secondary targets.

- 2) Disseminated Incident Scene: In the initial response to a disseminated incident scene (multiple counties or statewide), the staging of responding specialized assets should be designated by the state lead agency and located on a regional basis to maximize the coverage of the assets and reduce response times.

g. Chemical, Ordnance, Biological and Radiological (COBRA) Teams

- 1) These teams are designed to provide consequence management assistance to first responders during the initial hours of a critical incident until substantial state and federal assistance arrives. This specialized operational assistance augments local fire, law enforcement, emergency medical, and public health responders once it is recognized that incident conditions will exceed local asset capabilities.
- 2) COBRA Response Teams have been organized throughout the state and have the ability to respond to any location in the state. Teams will normally function under the operations section within existing Incident Command Systems established by local jurisdictions.
- 3) COBRA Response Teams are based on a tiered response capability and are organized into Basic and Advanced Teams. Basic teams are trained and equipped to provide decontamination assistance, protection action recommendations, medical management and limited agent detection. Advanced teams provide scene reconnaissance, agent detection and identification, patient decontamination and EOD support.

h. State WMD Response Team

Team is staffed by DHEC and SLED and is responsible for providing assistance to incident commanders with specialized law enforcement, tactical, and laboratory services. The team will also provide communications for law enforcement sensitive information to the SEOC and JTTF, and establish communications with COBRA and NGCST teams.

i. 43rd Civil Support Team (43rd NGCST)

Team is a SC National Guard asset designed to rapidly deploy to support local and state authorities at domestic WMD/NBC incident sites by identifying agents and substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with requests for additional military support.

j. The Role of Public Information: The objective of public information is to limit the media exposure terrorists seek and communicate a calm, measured, and reasoned reaction by the government. A review of public information should be considered in respect to its psychological impact. Media relations must be designed to identify terrorist activities as criminal acts not justifying public support and ensure that releasing information will not compromise counter-terrorism plans or operations. Information released must be verified and coordinated with Crisis Management authorities to ensure operational security of ongoing activities. Prior to establishment of a FBI JIC, coordination should be accomplished with the Crisis Management law enforcement agency PIOs. Rumor control should be coordinated through each agency PIO and releases of public information should be shared with the State Public Information Officer located in the Emergency Operations Center.

4. Disengagement: If an act of terrorism does not occur, the response disengages when the director of the SCEMD and the Chief of SLED, directs a cancellation notification. If an act of terrorism did occur, each state consequence management agency disengages upon notification from the Director, SCEMD, in coordination with the Chief of SLED.

VII. RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Pre-Incident Management:

1. State Law Enforcement Division:

- a. Develop, coordinate and maintain the terrorist crisis management SOP. During crisis management, SLED will coordinate operations closely with the FBI, JOC, and the local law enforcement authorities to achieve a successful law enforcement solution to the incident. SLED will determine what assistance local and federal authorities may need from state agencies to support crisis management. SLED will coordinate with SCEMD to insure required support from state agencies is provided.
- b. Upon receipt of information from the FBI/DHS regarding a credible threat or potential terrorist incident, evaluate the information and, if necessary, inform the Governor's office, SCEMD, and DHEC. Alert, support, and respond with the State WMD Response Team.
- c. Appoint an on-site commander to provide leadership and direction for the state crisis management response.
- d. Issue and coordinate crisis management actions assigned to state agencies.
- e. Assign the appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to the SEOC and Governor's office.
- f. In coordination with SCEMD, provide recommendations to the Governor regarding protective actions such as evacuation of personnel from the terrorist incident area.
- g. Conduct PIO activities to include public notification of the terrorist incident and staffing of JOC and JIC with PIO personnel.
- h. Develop and implement a perimeter control plan.
- i. Establish procedures for collection and disposition of evidence and disseminate to law enforcement agencies.
- j. Coordinate training of law enforcement staff and state agency personnel concerning counter-terrorism programs.

- k. Coordinate with SCNG for use of state military personnel and equipment, as required.
 - l. Investigate causes of terrorist incidents and collect evidence.
 - m. Compile and provide investigation reports.
 - n. Coordinate support to the coroner in the event mass fatality operations are necessary.
2. South Carolina Emergency Management Division:
- a. Provide representation to the JOC Command, and Consequence Management Groups as requested.
 - b. Formulate incident action plans, define priorities, review status, resolve conflicts, and identify issues that require decisions from higher authorities, and evaluate the need for additional resources.
 - c. Issue and track the status of consequence management actions assigned to state agencies.
 - d. Track the status of federal assistance requests.
 - e. Activate the SEOC.
 - f. Deploy of the Emergency Communications Vehicle (ECV) if necessary.
 - g. Coordinate the state's consequence management response with the lead federal and local consequence management agencies.
 - h. Coordinate and track Consequence Management rapid response assets.
 - i. Provide support to SLED PIO, as required.
3. Department of Natural Resources: Support operations with equipment and personnel.

4. Department of Public Safety:
 - a. Support operations with equipment and personnel.
 - b. Provide escort and security of rapid response assets.
 - c. Provide transport of evidence/samples.
 - d. Provide evacuation assistance.
5. Department of Social Services: Coordinate mass care, sheltering and feeding activities, as required.
6. Department of Transportation:
 - a. Support operations with equipment and personnel.
 - b. Prepare to provide large-scale evacuation transportation assistance.
7. Department of Health and Environmental Control:
 - a. Carry out educational programs for primary care and emergency department physicians on diagnosis of unusual agents and decontamination procedures, as well as on rapid reporting procedures for unusual diagnoses.
 - b. Establish a system for rapid notification of public health authorities about a suspected terrorist incident. DHEC will also advise or conduct stockpiling of essential drugs for first responders and the general public as necessary.
 - c. Identify, alert and request DHEC State WMD Team members and emergency medical teams to assist local responders in conducting assessment, detection, and mass casualty operations.
 - d. Prepare to coordinate assistance to the health and medical facilities. Alert hospital points of contact and the South Carolina Hospital Alliance of a potential medical emergency.
 - e. Prepare to coordinate environmental clean-up operations.
 - f. In a biological or occult chemical or radiation event, DHEC will coordinate diagnostic information, laboratory diagnosis

and disease reports to define the incident, and keep SLED and SCEMD fully notified of the degree of certainty of the diagnosis.

- g. Request assistance from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) for special diagnostic procedures and stockpile deployment as needed. Advise on appropriate methods of diagnosis, treatment, decontamination, infection control, and mass prophylaxis of exposed persons. Consult on determining necessary protective clothing, and safety measures for first responders entering affected areas.
8. South Carolina National Guard:
- a. Assist in manning control perimeters of critical infrastructure established by SLED.
 - b. Prepare to assist in mass evacuation operations.
 - c. Identify and prepare staging areas and support requirements for SCNG-WMDCST teams.
 - d. Provide SCNG-WMDCST team for support in detection and communication assistance.
9. Department of Mental Health: Coordinate and manage crisis counseling and mental health assistance.

B. Incident Management:

1. South Carolina Emergency Management Division:
- a. Conduct emergency management operations.
 - b. In coordination with the SERT Executive Coordination Group, establish operations priorities for consequence management.
 - c. Track and coordinate of rapid response assets and teams.
 - d. Assist in establishing communication links.
 - e. Assist in analysis of incident consequences and available specialized resources.
 - f. Provide SAT teams as required.

- g. Provide meteorological data as required.
 - h. Provide LNO to JOC and incident scene as required.
 - i. Provide PIO operations, as required.
- 2. South Carolina Law Enforcement Division:
 - a. Coordinate PIO support to SEOC, as required.
 - b. Develop and implement a perimeter control plan to secure the incident scene.
 - c. Support mass evacuation/relocation operations.
 - d. Provide security for critical infrastructure and potential targets.
 - e. Provide threat analysis.
- 3. Department of Natural Resources:
 - a. Support operations with equipment and personnel.
 - b. Provide communications support.
 - c. Provide search and rescue assistance.
- 4. Department of Public Safety:
 - a. Support operations with equipment and personnel.
 - b. Provide escort and security of rapid response assets.
 - c. Provide transport of evidence/samples.
 - d. Provide evacuation assistance.
 - e. Provide security for interstate decontamination/disinfection points if established.
 - f. Support border security operations.
- 5. Department of Social Services: Coordinate mass care, sheltering and feeding activities, as required.

6. Department of Transportation:
 - a. Support operations with equipment and personnel.
 - b. Provide evacuation assistance.
 - c. Provide assistance in victim relocation.
 - d. Assist in debris removal.
7. Department of Health and Environmental Control:
 - a. Perform mass health care and coordinate the provision of medical assistance.
 - b. Conduct epidemiological investigation.
 - c. Provide assistance to the mass casualty operations to include coordination with emergency medical providers.
 - d. In coordination with county consequence management agencies assist in establishing sites, procedures and policies to triage contaminated casualties.
 - e. Coordinate the transport of decontaminated and conventional casualties to area hospitals.
 - f. Initiate long-term monitoring of the environmental effects of the incident.
 - g. Plan and oversee environmental clean-up operations.
 - h. Assist in the development of protective action recommendations.
 - i. Implement medical response plan to include victim tracking and crisis counseling.
 - j. Inspect food supplies and general sanitation measures to ensure food and water supplies are free of agent and safe for consumption.
 - k. Determine what activities are necessary to resume normal public health conditions.

- l. Coordinate for the assistance of the Disaster Mortuary Team (DMORT) and the Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT).
 - m. Coordinate the acquisition and transport of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals.
 - n. Coordinate with the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Federal Coordinating Center (Ft. Jackson) for a possible influx of victims.
 - o. Consult and advise on the safety for re-entry into contaminated areas.
 - p. Assure the implementation of a crisis-counseling plan.
8. Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation; Division of Fire and Life Safety:
 - a. Coordinate, as necessary, staging areas and logistical support for search and rescue operations.
 - b. Assist in decontamination of victims and the site as necessary.
9. Department of Mental Health: Continue to coordinate and manage crisis counseling and mental health assistance.
10. American Red Cross:
 - a. Assist in mass care and sheltering activities, as required.
 - b. Assist with the Disaster Well-being Inquiry program.
 - c. Assist with spiritual and grief counseling.
 - d. Establish respite centers for rescue/recovery workers.

VIII. RECOVERY

The recovery from a terrorist incident will vary depending on the type of agent used, the severity of the attack, and the geographical area affected. The anticipated major areas of concern are:

A. Search and Rescue Operations and Victim Recovery Operations:

Search and rescue operations for survivors may require weeks of time, especially if there are building collapses. The site may also be so contaminated that it is not safe to enter for an extended period of time. The recovery of fatalities phase will begin when the incident commander along with public health, state law enforcement, and other federal authorities as required determine that no live victims remain. This decision will consider the climatic conditions, the agent used, and other factors specific to the incident. Great concern must be given to the psychological impact of such a decision on the mental health of the public and first responders. Long-term recovery operations may be required where a disseminated event is involved, a large geographical area, a highly contaminated area, or a large mass (structural collapse) is involved.

B. Mass Fatalities:

As these agents are capable of causing catastrophic casualties and fatalities, specialized response may be necessary. Consideration must be given to the contamination of the deceased, their personal articles, their modes of transportation, households, workplaces, and frequently visited areas. These items may have enough agent on them to affect mass fatality workers. Therefore specialized federal assets will probably be required. It must be considered that the victims and those items may contain evidence of the terrorist attack and all disposal and records of the deceased items must be coordinated with the lead law enforcement agency.

C. Site Restoration:

The initial site and secondary sites, due to patient and vehicle movement, may have lethal amounts of agent present. Additionally, infrastructure damage may be present. For psychological considerations, the site may have to be destroyed although the site is free of agent or reconstructed. Consideration should be given to the placement of a memorial *in lieu* of site restoration to the original function. The oversight of the site restoration should be a coordinated effort of federal, state, and local authorities. All restoration efforts should follow established federal laws and regulations in regards to worker safety and decontamination levels. The site may require demolition of buildings, removal of topsoil and other biomass, and decontamination of underground infrastructure and aquifers among others. In addition, disposal and removal of contaminated material may require specialized assistance for many years. At all times, close coordination with the lead law enforcement agency is a necessity.

D. Psychological Rehabilitation:

This area may be the most important to a long-term recovery, depending on the agent used. Immediate critical incident stress debriefing and therapy must be conducted as soon as possible. This may necessitate statewide means of communication and training. Although only a small percentage of the population may be physically or financially affected, a large majority of the population may be psychologically affected.

E. Financial Rehabilitation:

The costs of the incident may require a number of local, state, and federal agencies in support. Secondary costs associated with a terrorist incident may be significantly more than the actual incident. The cost of psychological rehabilitation, long-term medical effects, legal issues, and insurance coverage will be large, as well as the loss in revenue from decreased worker productivity and acquisition, tourism, and trade in marketable products from the state.

F. Agent Specific Health Concerns:

The extent of these concerns will depend on the amount and purity of the agent, its immediate and long-term health consequences, its dispersion, and decomposition by environmental and decontamination procedures.

1. Biological: Biological agents can be contagious for decades. Quarantine can last for long periods of time and involve large numbers. Long lasting health consequences may be common even with appropriate medical care. Disinfection of the site may require years and repeated attempts. Secondary infections due to unknown patient and material movement may arise years later. The psychological effect may be more pronounced and widespread due to the difficulty in detection and secondary hosts.
2. Nuclear/Radiological: Long-term health effects may be pronounced with radiological agents, in particular birth defects and cancers. The site may not be usable for many years due to potential health and psychological complications. The recruitment of medical specialists and training of health care providers may become critical since the effects of these agents are rarely seen. Detection should be adequate for the assessment of long-term health risks at the site.
3. Chemical: The long-term effects on victims will vary tremendously with the agent and exposure route. Some agents can produce birth defects and increase cancer rates. Respiratory and

dermatological long-term effects may be pronounced. Detection should be adequate for the assessment of long-term health risks at the site.

4. Incendiary/Explosives: The immediate health effects should be known in a short period of time. Long-term trauma and burn rehabilitation may be necessary for a large number of patients. Infrastructure damage will likely be extensive but should be assessable in a short period of time. The secondary effects from the agent at the site will primarily depend on the site attacked and the debris characteristics.

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